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THE VIABILITY OF GUANTÁNAMO BAY DETAINEES’ ALIEN
TORT STATUTE CLAIMS SEEKING DAMAGES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST
ARBITRARY DETENTION
Irena Nikolic ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Faithful adherence to the United States Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine is most uncertain when national security is
threatened. During these times, when expediency and unwavering
resolve are generally considered paramount, the balance of national
power, largely as a consequence of public support, has historically
1
shifted in one direction—toward the executive. This shift in national power reduces the effectiveness of the power of the other governmental branches, and renders unstable the national power structure. Aside from the natural unsteadiness generated by a power
imbalance, such a shift causes the nation to feel tremors for years to
come because the contours of the recalibrated powers are often illdefined. As a result, a struggle for the right to define the provisional
scope of our governmental powers during difficult times emerges and
manifests itself, most conspicuously, in the courtroom. The courtroom becomes the center of attention as individuals urge judicial review of violations of rights on the basis of executive action, while the
executive argues to foreclose review of such claims on the basis of
broad executive power in times of national insecurity. This Comment
analyzes the consequences and implications of one such struggle: the
∗

J.D. Candidate, 2007. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Baher Azmy,
who gave me invaluable substantive and structural guidance throughout the drafting
of this comment and my editors, Stephanie Reckord and Michael Colavito, who
worked hard to make sure that it all came together.
1
See Newshour with Jim Lehrer Transcript, Presidential Power, Dec. 24, 2001,
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec01/hist_1224.html. For a discussion on the constitutional scope of presidential power during
national insecurity, see John C. Yoo and Neil J. Kinkopf, What are the Limits of
Presidential Power? at http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_
presidentialpower1105.msp (last visited February 24, 2007).
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disposition of arbitrary detention claims brought by Guantánamo Bay
2
detainees under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
While courts have been open to habeas relief claims brought by
those detained by the United States in Guantánamo as part of the
3
“War on Terror,” they have been closed to ATS claims against the
government for violations of fundamental human rights prohibited
4
by international law. Thus, these claims have been dismissed with5
out substantial review. In such cases, the courts have deferred to the
executive, holding that sovereign immunity and military authority bar
6
judicial review of executive action in war time. However, even if
courts were to consider detainee ATS claims of arbitrary detention on
their merits (that is, if they were to decide whether arbitrary detention is a violation of the law of nations and, if so, whether such a vio7
lation had occurred in the case at hand), Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has
given many reasons to believe that the courts may not deem arbitrary
8
detention a violation of the law of nations.
The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
9
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
Similar to the broad language suggested by the ATS text, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena10
Irala broadly interpreted the ATS, finding that an alien may bring a
civil action in United States federal courts for any violation of the law
of nations, as evidenced by “the general assent of civilized nations” or

2
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (1789).
3
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding that federal courts have
jurisdiction to determine “the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing”).
4
See, e.g., In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480–81 (D.C.
Cir. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 326 n.19 (D.D.C. 2005); Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring), aff’d,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 n.11 (D.D.C.
2002), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (denying federal courts jurisdiction
over habeas relief claims brought by aliens in the Executive’s detention).
5
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
6
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
7
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
8
See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What
Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 115
(2004) (arguing that “[c]omparing piracy to modern international law norms reveals
that new causes of action under the ATS cannot be created without abandoning the
fidelity to the historical paradigms mandated by [Sosa]”).
9
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
10
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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11

U.S. treaty.
In Sosa, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States narrowly interpreted the ATS, purporting to severely limit the
12
substantive claims that may be brought under the statute.
In Part II, this Comment explains the development of the ATS in
U.S. courts. This section discusses the historical context and purpose
of the ATS, the advent of the modern approach to the ATS as first
espoused in Filartiga and the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation
of the Statute in Sosa. It also identifies the analytical differences between the approaches used in Filartiga and Sosa to interpret the ATS
in this section. Part III discusses the standards set out in Sosa, the international law condemnation of arbitrary detention and the implication of Sosa on the substantive rights for detainees held indefinitely in
Guantánamo Bay as “enemy combatants,” to bring ATS claims for arbitrary detention. Finally, pursuant to the application of the Sosa
standard of analysis, the Comment concludes in this section that the
prohibition against arbitrary detention is an actionable law of nations
under the ATS. Additionally, it further concludes that the Guantánamo Bay detentions are arbitrary according to the law of nations
because the law of nations requires access to procedural protections
for such detainees. Next, in Part IV, the Comment discusses the issue
of sovereign immunity as a bar to ATS litigation. This section concludes that sovereign immunity does not provide a bar to these ATS
claims because the “military authority” exemption to the Administrative Protection Act (APA) waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply when the complaint arises from the military’s engagement of non13
state actors beyond the field of battle. Additionally, it reaches this
11

See id. at 880–81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745–49.
13
It is also arguable that the recently enacted Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (the “MCA”) bars detainee ATS actions against
United State officials. Section 5(a) of the MCA provides:
12

IN GENERAL – No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or
any other protocol thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or
former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other
agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any
court in the Unites States or its States or territories.
Id. However, many arguments can be made to challenge the application of the MCA
to detainee ATS claims, especially pending claims. For instance, it can be argued
that the section 5(a) does not apply retrospectively to pending ATS cases because,
unlike numerous other provisions therein, it does not expressly state that it applies
to pending cases. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2765 (2006) (“A familiar
principle of statutory construction . . . is that a negative inference may be drawn
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conclusion because the prohibition against arbitrary detention is a
fundamental human right at international law from which no derogation is permitted. In conclusion, this Comment asserts that the Bush
Administration overreaches in its attempt to foreclose judicial review
of the Guantanamo detainees’ arbitrary detention claims under the
ATS. Additionally, it posits that the Bush Administration’s policy with
respect to the ATS is short-sighted because, in an attempt to achieve
absolute protection against claims of international law violations, it
abandons the United States’ central role in shaping international
human rights law. This Comment proposes instead that federal
courts fulfill their constitutional responsibility by asserting their authority to review substantive ATS claims against state action carried
out by government actors.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATS IN THE COURTS
A. Historical Context and Purpose of the ATS
The origins of the ATS are largely uncertain because the debate
in the Senate over the Judiciary Act of 1789, which contains the ATS,
was not recorded and the recorded debate in the House made no
14
mention of the ATS. Nevertheless, the historical context of its enactment suggests that the ATS arose in response to Constitutional
Convention delegates’ concern “with establishing and distributing authority in the federal government, rather than in the states, over matters affecting foreign relations,” which was thought to be crucial for
15
the establishment and survival of a new nation. In furthering this
from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other
provisions of the same statute.”). This conclusion is supported in the fact that Congress rejected the Bush Administration-sponsored bill, which contained a general
provision providing for retroactive application of the entire Act. Bringing Terrorists
to Justice Act of 2006, S. 3861, 109th Cong. § 9 (placed on calendar in Senate, Sept.
8, 2006). Even if section 5 is found to be unambiguously prospective, however, it
would likely fail to overcome the “presumption against retroactive legislation,” which
can only be overcome when its “language compels this result.” Landgraf v. USI Films
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316–17
(2001) (“Cases where this Court has found truly ‘retroactive’ effect adequately authorized by statute have involved statutory language that was so clear that it could
sustain only one interpretation.”). Thus, assuming that Congress did have the authority to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over ATS claims brought by detainees, it is by no means clear that the MCA strips the courts of jurisdiction over pending ATS claims.
14
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782–833 (J. Gales ed., 1789).
15
Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquires
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 11 (1985).
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end, the delegates “understood the importance of international
16
law.” They knew that a “young nation’s ability to maintain peaceful
relations would depend largely on its compliance with the law of na17
tions and with its treaty obligations.” Historical investigation also
reveals that “the drafters [of the Judiciary Act] thought it necessary to
confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over actions involving aliens”
because such actions commonly affected foreign relations and because of the belief that the United States should take responsibility
18
for its injuries to aliens. More generally, the drafters of the Judiciary
Act may have conferred jurisdiction in the federal courts over actions
involving aliens because federal law governs immigration and natu19
ralization.
It was not unusual for Congress at the time to enact a statute that
would provide federal courts with jurisdiction over causes of action
arising from violations of the laws of nations because the law of na20
This sentitions had been considered part of the common law.
ment, which provides a general motive for the ATS enactment, was
21
echoed more than 100 years later, in Paquete Habana, where the Supreme Court of the United States held that “international law is part
of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de22
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination.” Thus,
it is not surprising that Congress did not expend considerable time
debating the merits of the ATS in federal courts.

16
Id. at 12 (“By the eighteenth century, the law of nations was part of the law of
England and thus applied to the colonies . . . . With American independence in
1776, English law in the colonies—including the law of nations—was ‘received’ as
common law in America.”).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 15–17.
19
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
20
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The law of nations
forms an integral part of the common law. . . . [I]t became a part of the common law
of the United States upon the adoption of the Constitution. Therefore, the enactment of the Alien Tort Statute was authorized by Article III”); see also Respublica v.
De Lonchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 113, 116 (1784) (applying the law of nations protecting the personhood of ambassadors in a prosecution of a person who had assaulted
the French Counsel-General to the United States).
21
175 U.S. 677 (1900).
22
Id. at 700.
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B. The Modern ATS: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and Deference to
International Definition of the Laws of Nations.
The Second Circuit infused the ATS with meaning in Filartiga,
where two Paraguayan citizens in the U.S. on a visitor’s Visa brought
an action against another Paraguayan citizen for allegedly torturing
23
their son in Paraguay and, thereby, wrongfully causing his death. In
Filartiga, the court held that “deliberate torture perpetrated under
color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the
international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the
parties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with
process by an alien within our borders, the [ATS] provides federal ju24
risdiction.”
In Filartiga, the court treated the ATS as a grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction to recognize and adjudicate claims that violate the law of
25
nations. As such, it had to determine whether Filartiga had asserted
26
a claim based on a violation of a law of nations. This question, however, immediately gave rise to the dispute about which governmental
body is entitled to define the substance of an ATS claim, Congress or
the judiciary. The defense argued that Article III of the federal Constitution did not permit federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
27
non-statutory claims. The plaintiff asserted that, in the absence of
implementing legislation, the judiciary is charged with determining
28
whether the complaint alleges a violation of the law of nations. The
court weighed in squarely on the plaintiff’s side, indicating that it was
the judiciary’s duty to define the substance of ATS claims. The court
explained:
[c]ommon law courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate
transitory tort claims between individuals over whom they exercise
personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred. Moreover, as
part of an articulated scheme of federal control over external affairs, Congress provided in the first Judiciary Act for federal jurisdiction over suits by aliens where principles of international law

23

See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–80.
Id. at 878.
25
See id. at 880.
26
Id.
27
Defendant Appellee's Brief in Support of Judgment of Dismissal at 8–11, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
28
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 14–16, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) (No. 79-6090).
24
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are in issue. The Constitutional basis for the [ATS] is the law of
29
nations, which has always been part of the federal common law.

Further, as evidence that international law exists in federal courts in
the absence of congressional legislation, the court invoked Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that “an act of [C]ongress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construc30
tion remains.” Thereby, the court explained that since the judiciary
had traditionally sought to construe federal legislation so as to comport with the law of nations, the law of nations had been treated as
31
part of the federal common law.
With confidence that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over ATS
32
claims, the court next explained the source of the law of nations.
The law of nations, the court indicated, “may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists . . . or by the general usage and practice of
33
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”
The court also cited Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, which provides the following list sources of international law: (a) international conventions, i.e. treaties; (b) “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c)
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;” and (d)
“judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified pub34
licists of the various nations.” Next, because international custom
was the basis of Filartiga’s claim, the court had to decide when a cus35
tom has evolved (or ripened) into a law of nations. To this end, the
court adopted the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Paquete Habana, which found that an “[international] standard that
began as one of comity only had ripened . . . into ‘a settled rule of international law [by] the general assent of civilized nations’” over
36
many years. Thus, the court stated “it is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved

29
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. Filartiga does not recognize the problem of claiming
that the law of nations is part of the federal common law that the Supreme Court focuses on in Sosa—namely, that since common law today is no longer considered to be
derived from natural law, but rather the will of a judge, there is a strong inclination
to only give force to written, i.e. statutory, law.
30
Id. at 887 n.20 (quoting The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 67 (1804)).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 880 (citing U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820)).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 881 n.8 (citing The Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38,
59 Stat. 1055, 1–60 (1945)).
35
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
36
Id. (quoting Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
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and exists among the nations of the world today.” The court, however, also acknowledged that the requirement of the “general assent”
by of civilized nations” greatly limits the number of claims that can be
38
based on a violation of an international law of nations.
As evidence of international customary practice, Filartiga recognized that torture has been renounced as “an instrument of official
39
policy by virtually all of the nations of the world.” The court referred to opinions of international jurists and universal condemnation of torture in international agreements to conclude that torture
was a violation of the law of nations and, thus, an actionable tort un40
More specifically, the court first noted that
der the ATS.
“[d]istinguished international scholars” vouched that the law of na41
tions prohibits use of torture. Then, it listed international agreements that contained provisions barring torture, among which were
42
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nation’s
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“the
43
Declaration”). The court identified the latter as providing reparations for torture victims, indicating that “[w]here it is proved that an
act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment has been committed by or at the instigation of a public
official, the victim shall be afforded redress and compensation, in ac44
cordance with national law. Further, the court explained that the
Declaration provides a detailed breakdown of state obligations and
45
responsibilities. As especially relevant, the court pointed to Article
Three of the Declaration, which provides that “[e]xceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in-

37

Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428–30 (1964)
(where citizens alleged that the Cuban government’s expropriation of the assets of a
foreign corporation was a violation of customary international law, as an example of
an action that civilized nations have not generally agreed to prohibit)).
39
Id. at 880.
40
Id. at 879 n.4, 881.
41
Id. at 879 n.4.
42
G.A. Res. 217A(III), art. 5, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“no one shall be subject to torture”).
43
See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882; G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No.
34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (Dec. 9, 1975) (expressly prohibiting states from permitting acts of torture and was adopted by the general assembly without dissent).
44
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883. In the United States, the ATS is the national law that
could provide redress for such violations because it provides for redress for victims of
violations of international law. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
45
See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883.
38
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stability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
46
punishment.” Although the court recognized that United Nations
Declarations are not binding per se, it found that they may be a
source of the law of nations because they “create[] an expectation of
adherence, and ‘insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by
state practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as lay47
ing down rules binding upon the states.’” Additionally, the court
explained, “Paraguay’s renunciation of torture as a legitimate instrument of state policy . . . [did] not strip the tort of its character as an
international law violation, if it in fact occurred under color of gov48
ernment authority.”
Filartiga remains a powerful example of how the federal courts
can enforce international human rights. Filartiga is significant because its analytical approach called for deference to the international
community’s judgment, as embodied in a host of conventions and
practices, for evidence of international customary law. As such, it reflected trust in the judgment and commitment manifested by the international community to define and prohibit international law. Further, for many, Filartiga embodies the true spirit of ATS—the notion
that the judiciary has a constitutional mandate to enforce international law. At the time, this notion was recognized by the Carter Administration, which, in support of judicial authority under the ATS,
stated that “[l]ike many other areas affecting international relations,
the protection of fundamental human rights is not committed exclu49
sively to the political branches of government.” Instead, the Carter
Administration indicated:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification
or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,
the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions re-

46

G.A. Res. 3452, supra note 43. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443 (D.C. Cir. 2005) and others have found that detainee torture suits against the
state cannot proceed because of a military defense exception under the Administrative Procedures Act, which appears to contravene the principle above. See infra Part
VII.
47
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883 (quoting Memorandum of Office of Legal Affairs,
U.N. Secretariat, 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 8, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1/610
(1962)).
48
Id. at 890; cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (subjecting state official to
suit for constitutional violations despite immunity of state).
49
Brief of Amici Curiae United States 22, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 430 n.34 (1964)) [hereinafter U.S. Filartiga Memorandum].
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garding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of
an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
50
national interest or with international justice.

Accordingly, the Carter Administration agreed with the Second Circuit in Filartiga that there is no separation of powers, i.e. “[no] danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts,”
when the judiciary confines ATS litigation to violations as to which
“there is consensus in the international community that the right is
protected and that there is a widely shared understanding of the
51
scope of that right.”
C. Narrowing of the ATS: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In Sosa, the facts indicate that a Mexican national, AlvarezMachain, was abducted pursuant to the orders of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by Sosa and other Mexican nationals
from Mexico and brought to the United States to be tried for the
52
murder and torture of a DEA agent. Alvarez was detained by the
53
DEA agents for less than a day before he was arraigned. After his
acquittal, Alvarez-Machain sued Sosa under the ATS for violating the
54
international law prohibition against arbitrary detention.
Specifically, Alvarez-Machain alleged that his detention in U.S. custody was
arbitrary under international law because his arrest and detention
55
were not authorized under United States law.
The Supreme Court rejected Alvarez’s proposed definition of
arbitrary detention as too broad to constitute a binding customary international law, interpreting it as “a general prohibition of ‘arbitrary’
detention defined as officially sanctioned action exceeding positive
authorization to detain under the domestic law of some government,
56
regardless of the circumstances.” To “underscore[]” the unsuitability of Alvarez-Machain’s proposed definition of arbitrary detention,
the Court pointed to “the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (1987), which says in its discussion of customary international human rights law that a ‘state violates interna50

Id. at 23.
Id. at 22.
52
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004).
53
Id. at 738.
54
Id. at 733.
55
Id. at 735 (arguing that “the DEA lacked extraterritorial authority under 21
U.S.C. § 878, and because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(d)(2) limited the
warrant for Alvarez’s arrest to ‘the jurisdiction of the United States’”).
56
Id. at 736.
51
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tional law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or
57
condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention.’” Alvarez-Machain’s
proposed definition, the Court explained, lacked both the require58
ment for “state policy” and “prolonged” detention.
Invoking the facts of Alvarez’s detention, the Supreme Court
held that “a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the
transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment,
violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to
59
support the creation of a federal remedy.” Thus, the Court found
that Alvarez did not allege facts that gave rise to a violation of a law of
nations and, therefore, he was not entitled to a remedy under the
60
ATS.
The Court, however, seized the opportunity provided by Sosa to
interpret the standard of review courts should employ in determining
whether an alleged violation of customary international law is action61
able under the ATS. The Court explained that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no cause of action, except with respect to international law violations that conform to those fully formed in 1789,
i.e. offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and pi62
racy. The Court established the following judicial standard of re57

Id. at 737 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 (1987)). The Court here does not adopt the Restatement’s definition of arbitrary detention as sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under the
ATS. Rather, the Court explained,
[e]ven the Restatement's limits are only the beginning of the inquiry,
because although it is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad that those who enforce them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to say which policies cross
that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone's three common law
offenses.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737. Blackstone’s three common law offenses were offenses against
ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
58
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737–38.
59
Id. at 738. “Any credible invocation of a principle against arbitrary detention
that the civilized world accepts as binding customary international law requires a factual basis beyond relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority.” Id. at 737.
60
Id. at 737–38.
61
Id. at 749.
62
Id. In the eighteenth century, when the ATS was passed, Blackstone defined
the law of nations as:
[a] system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world; in order
to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to
insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse
which most frequently occur between two or more independent states,
and the individuals belonging to each.
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view: “federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with
less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
63
historical paradigms familiar when §1350 was enacted.”
By interpreting the statute, the Court resolved a long-standing
debate over the proper implementation of the ATS: whether the ATS
was purely a grant of jurisdiction, requiring implementing legislation,
or whether it provided the judicial branch with subject-matter jurisdiction, the discretion to recognize claims based on international
64
law. As noted, the Court resolved the debate with a compromise,
holding that a “narrow set” of international law violations—those that
that are as definite in content and acceptance among civilized nations as were the violations of the law of nations recognized in 1789—
are directly actionable under the ATS; the Court concluded that the
ATS is otherwise a purely jurisdictional statute, requiring the congressional passage of specific implementing statutes for claims be65
yond that “narrow set.”
The Court provided five distinct reasons grounded in the separation of powers doctrine for limiting the scope of private rights de66
rived from the law of nations. First, the Court explained that when
the ATS was enacted, the accepted view was that judges discovered
the common law, which always independently existed, but today it is
67
commonly understood that the common law is really judge-made.
Consequently, a judge charged with making decisions in reliance on
international norms will wield a great deal of discretionary law68
making power. Thus, the Court deemed that the current countermajoritarian conception of common law, as providing the judiciary
with unrestrained discretion, counsels against permitting the judiciary to use such discretion to determine which international laws can

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *66 (1979) (A facsimile of the first edition of 1765–1769). According to Blackstone, the principal offenses against the law of nations were: (1) violation of safe-conducts, (2) infringement on rights of ambassadors, and (3) piracy. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 (citing
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES, at *68).
63
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. Alvarez-Machain’s proposed definition of arbitrary detention not only fell short of the Court’s articulated standard, it also fell short of the
Restatement’s definition of arbitrary detention, which arguably reflects customary
international law. Id. at 737.
64
Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 117–18.
65
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715, 725.
66
See id at 749–51.
67
See id. at 749.
68
Id. at 726.
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69

provide the basis for an ATS claim. Second, the Court considered
70
the radical effect Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins had on federal judges’
law-making role. In Erie, the Supreme Court denied the existence of
71
“general” federal common law. In doing so, the Court indicated
that federal judges should look to the legislature for guidance before
72
carving out new substantive law at their discretion. Thus, again, the
Sosa Court indicated that the judiciary does not have the authority to
73
make law. Third, complementing the Erie rationale, the Court emphasized that it is more suitable for the legislative judgment to be ex74
ercised in the creation of a new private right. Fourth, the Court
found that the judiciary should be reticent to impose upon the discretion of the legislative and executive branches in the realm of foreign affairs by recognizing private causes of action based upon viola75
tions of international law. Lastly, the Court found that Congress has
not mandated for the federal courts to find and apply new violations
of international law, nor does Congress seem particularly inclined to
76
grant such judicial activity in the future.
As noted above, after disparaging the role of the judiciary in defining substantive rights under the ATS, the Court did hold that there
are instances when it is appropriate for the judiciary to find that a law
of nations is a suitable basis for an ATS claim, absent congressional
77
guidance. The Court found that although its inclination is to defer
to Congress for substantive rights under the ATS, it concluded that
the text of the ATS indicates that it was not Congress’s intent to have
the ATS lie dormant until legislation is passed; rather, the statute was
78
to have immediate effect through judicial recognition of rights.
Thus, the Court reaffirmed the authority of the judiciary to define

69

Id.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71
Id. at 78.
72
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
73
See id.
74
Id. at 727 (citing Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)).
75
Id. at 727–28.
76
Id. at 728. But see H.R. REP. No. 102-367(I), at 4 (1991), as reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (referring to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 as the
first legislation providing a cause of action under the Alien Tort Claims Act, Congress stated that “[c]laims based on torture and summary execution do not exhaust
the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by the [ATS]. That statute
should remain intact to permit suits based on other norm that already exist or may
ripen in the future into rules of customary international law”).
77
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.
78
See id.
70

NIKOLICFINAL

906

4/20/2007 12:56:58 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:893

and review claims arising under the ATS, that is, so long as the claims
are as definite in “content and acceptance among civilized nations
79
[as] the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”
D. Filartiga and Sosa Establish Categorically Different Modes of
Analyzing the ATS
In Sosa, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the standard of
80
analysis it sets out comports with that in Filartiga. Referring to Filartiga, the Court stated that the limitations this decision imposes on
judges in recognizing violations of the law of nations as bases for a
claim under the ATS in the future are “generally consistent with the
reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue be81
fore . . . .” A cursory glance at the two cases, however, indicates that
in Sosa the Supreme Court deviated significantly from the method
adopted in Filartiga for deciding whether an alleged law of nations
violation is actionable under the ATS.
One fundamental difference is that in Filartiga, Judge Kaufman
sought guidance from twentieth century U.N. Declarations and Conventions in determining what actions constituted a violation of a law
82
of nations within the meaning of the ATS; by contrast, the Supreme
Court looked only to the paradigm of law of nations as it was under83
stood in 1789. Similarly, whereas Judge Kaufman required only the
“general assent of civilized nations” to find that an action is a viola84
tion of the law of nations, the Court, by inference, required that the
act complained of be as “definite [in] content and acceptance among
civilized nations” as the acts that had been considered violations of
85
the law of nations in 1789.
Although the Sosa Court was rather adamant that the judiciary
should be reticent to recognize a cause of action arising under the
ATS, absent a congressional mandate, it did not provide clear guidance for future judicial action. That is, the Court did not indicate the
steps a judge should take to determine whether the cause of action
urged by a plaintiff rises to the level of a violation of the law of nations that is as definite in “content and acceptance among civilized
nations [as] the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was en79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id. at 732.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880−81 (2d Cir. 1980).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
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acted,” so as to constitute a legitimate basis for cause of action even in
86
the absence of a U.S. statute.
A contextual reading of the opinion suggests some possibilities.
First, a judge faced with an ATS claim should first deconstruct the
elements of one of the offenses recognized at international law in
1789, i.e. piracy, and determine the nature and scope of its prohibition at the time. Then, the judge should do the same with the alleged violation of international law in the complaint before him. Finally, the judge should do a point-by-point comparison of the two to
determine whether the law of nations violation complained of in his
courtroom today is as sufficiently defined and as widely recognized as
the law of nations violations of 1789. Presumably, if the prohibition
against an act complained of today is as well-defined and widely recognized internationally as was an actionable law of nations violation
in 1789, it too should be actionable under the ATS.
Rather than focusing solely on the scope and depth of universal
condemnation of an act in the abstract, the Court in Sosa decided
that the characteristics of the act complained of, as reflected in the
nature and scope of its prohibition at international law in 1789,
should serve to guide future decisions whether to recognize a particu87
lar act as a violation of the law of nations for ATS purposes. Subtly,
Sosa has freed the federal courts to reject a law of nations that may
have achieved wide and deep recognition, as is evidenced by U.N.
Declarations, for instance, on the ground that it does not conform to
the 1789 paradigm of a violation of a law of nations (that is, it is not
analogous enough to piracy). Fundamentally, the difference between
Filartiga and Sosa is that, in the former, the court was willing to defer
to the international community for a definition of a violation of a law
88
of nations whereas, in the latter, the Supreme Court was only willing
to recognize violations of the law of nations assented to by the international community today, after it has measured it against its 1789
89
paradigm or statutorily enacted by Congress. Thus, Sosa provides an
extra hurdle for a law of nations, defined as such by the international
community, to jump through before it may be deemed a violation of
90
the law of nations for ATS purposes. This hurdle was noticeably absent in Filartiga.

86
87
88
89
90

Id.
See id.
See supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737.
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PARSING SOSA

As explained in the previous section, the Sosa standard for law of
nations recognition under the ATS requires a parsing of the characteristics of eighteenth century violations of the law of nations and the
91
nature and scope of its prohibition. The most frequently invoked
eighteenth century law of nations, and the most susceptible to a characterization as a violation of international law/human right, is the
92
prohibition of piracy. As such, piracy will serve as the measure of an
eighteenth century law of nations violation to which the prohibition
of arbitrary detention will be compared here.
Since Sosa, the task of characterizing piracy as a violation of the
law of nations has been undertaken, among may others, by Professor
93
Eugene Kontorovich. Kontorovich purported to identify “the salient characteristics of [piracy], which in turn become the characteristics that a [customary international law] norm must posses [sic] to be
94
actionable under the ATS” and further concluded that Sosa has in
95
practice shut the door on future human rights litigation. For the
purposes of this section, this Comment will refer to Kontorovich’s
characteristics of piracy because they raise the pertinent issues with
respect to what are the characteristics of the crime of piracy that
compelled the Court to designate it a model cause of action under
the ATS. Unlike Kontorovich, however, this Comment concludes
that Sosa does not foreclose future human rights litigation and that
arbitrary detention can indeed emerge as a law of nations violation
under Sosa analysis. In other words, this Comment argues that the
prohibition against arbitrary detention at international law today is as

[A]lthough it is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary
detentions are so bad that those who enforce them become enemies of
the human race [and, thus, punishable under international law], it may
be harder to say which policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three common law offenses.
Id.
91

Id. at 749.
See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. But see ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 91–
105 (2d ed. 1998) (questioning international law as a direct source of law and jurisdiction in piracy).
93
See Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 111.
94
Id. at 113; but see RUBIN, supra note 92 at 117–20 (indicating that “[t]he phrase
‘law of nations’ in 1705 was itself ambiguous” and that, therefore, in the eighteenth
century, it had not been reconciled whether the crime of piracy was merely a reflection of individual nations’ municipal law or whether it was a reflection of a sort of
international prohibition that existed regardless of the nature of the prohibition in
any individual nation).
95
RUBIN, supra note 92, at 116.
92
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“definite [in] content and acceptance among civilized nations” as was
96
the prohibition against piracy in 1789.
First, Kontorovich argued that international law today is distinguishable from the prohibition of piracy in the eighteenth century
because, unlike piracy, international laws today do not reflect in the
97
municipal law of most nations. This assertion is not accurate. Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice explicitly points
98
Alto common municipal laws as a source of international law.
though it is true that Article 38 indicates that international law may
arise from ubiquitous customary practice among nations alone, this is
no reason to assume that all human rights-oriented international laws
are derived from customary practice alone, rather than the nations’
99
municipal laws. On the contrary, if we were to place more stock in
the laws of Western nations, as is invariably done by international institutions in codifying international law, there would be a clear indication that international human rights laws do reflect the municipal
100
laws of the democratic nations of the world.
Second, Kontorovich asserts that, unlike international laws today, “piracy had a narrow and universally agreed on definition; the
conduct it proscribed was well understood, thus preventing conflict
between states about the propriety of [universal jurisdiction over the
101
act].” This argument falls short as well because history has revealed

96

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 114. This Comment states “most nations,”
whereas Kontorovich states “all nations,” because it is safe to assume that his source
for the ubiquitous municipal law prohibition of piracy among nations was referring
to “civilized” nations, i.e. European and North American nations. Id. It is justified in
making this inference because the practices of the nations of Africa, Asia, the Middle
East, and South America were not generally consulted before scholars of the time
proclaimed a custom universal.
98
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945) (providing the following as sources of international law: (1) treaties—international conventions; (2) “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law” (International Customary Law); (3) “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations”; and (4) subject to Article 59, “judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law”).
99
This is especially true since the U.S. Constitution and laws prohibit most, if not
all, of the conduct that would give rise to a human rights violation at international
law.
100
Brief for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and
Amnesty International USA as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Benitez v.
Mata, 542 U.S. 902 (2004) (No. 03-7434), 2004 WL 354194 [hereinafter Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights].
101
Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 114.
97
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that the prohibition of piracy was dubious at best.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European nations clandestinely employed pirates, thus giving rise to the enterprise of privateering, to
103
plunder the coasts of competing nations.
As such, one nation’s pirate was commonly another nation’s legitimate instrument. Thus,
even if the written definition of the offense of piracy had been similarly defined among most nations, the circumstances that surrounded
the offense clearly gave rise to variance in the enforcement and pun104
That is, the fear of forum shopping should not
ishment of piracy.
limit the individual’s substantive rights to be free from certain types
of conduct, the prohibition of which is well defined and widely accepted in international law today.
Third, Kontorovich argued “all nations made piracy punishable
by death. Thus it would not lead to forum shopping or disputes
105
among nations” as to what punishment should be inflicted.”
Inversely, he implied that international law today does give rise to forum shopping and disputes about punishment. However, the fact
that the punishment was the same in every nation does not itself
eliminate the potential for forum shopping. That is, a plaintiff may
decide to seek redress in one forum or another on the basis of a variety of factors, including whether one country’s procedures are perceived as more plaintiff-friendly than another’s, that may contribute
106
Ultimately, these matters are not
in securing a favorable verdict.
significant in the characterization of a violation of the law of nations
for ATS purposes because they do not comport with the purpose of
vindicating international rights, one of the motivations underlying in-

102
WILLIAM MCFEE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 105 (1950); see also RUBIN, supra note 92,
at 74--86 (providing an account of one incident in England that illustrates how fine
the line is between pirate and privateer).
103
MCFEE, supra note 102, at 109–10.
All through the ages law has too often been what the citizen could get
away with . . . . Perhaps the most spectacular illustration of the wavering character of the law on the sea was [Queen Elizabeth’s] relations
with her seamen in the long struggle with Spain. Theirs was the responsibility. If they were caught she disowned them. The Spanish ambassador in London might rage, but the Queen would shrug and deny
any share in the affront to his master. If her seamen came home laden
with booty, she took her dividends like the rest of the ladies and gentlemen who had financed the pirates’ expeditions.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 114.
106
See generally, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative
Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 314 (1997).
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107

ternational law. Indeed, the protections that international law, especially human rights law, provides and the obligations it imposes
have operated despite procedural challenges that arise from their ex108
istence. Thus, any procedural difficulties that arise from a country’s
assertion of jurisdiction over an incident sounding in international
law is not limited simply because there may be variance among domestic courts in adjudicating the issue. That is, the fear of forum
shopping should not limit the individuals’ substantive rights to be
free from certain types of conduct, the prohibition of which is well
defined and widely accepted in international law today.
Fourth, Kontorovich claimed that “pirates were private actors
who had refused the protection of their home states by failing to obtain a letter of marque, an easily secured authorization that would
109
But, again, history indicates
make their conduct perfectly legal.”
that pirates and privateers, those hired by one’s government to make
war on other governments, were virtually indistinguishable: “[t]he
same qualities which made a good privateer, enterprise, ruthless discipline, leadership and independence of conventional rules of con110
duct, were ideal equipment for piracy.”
In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, all belligerents, whether private or statesponsored, were considered pirates, as is evidenced by the fact that
the enemy state treated them as criminal actors and because their
sponsoring state usually denied the fact of sponsorship upon their
111
capture. Thus, the majority of the action that led up to the univer112
Given
sal prohibition of piracy had been commissioned by states.
the fact that piracy was routinely state-sponsored, it is not surprising
that the activity precipitously declined with the signing of the Decla113
ration of Paris of 1856, which specifically abolished “privateering.”
Thus, universal condemnation of piracy was directed at curtailing the
107

See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 217 (2000) (“[G]overnments construct international regimes to adjudicate and enforce human rights.”).
108
See id. at 218. Today, forum shopping and varying punishment concerns with
respect to adjudicating violations of human rights law have largely been overcome
because such violations are often adjudicated in international courts, rather than
state courts. See id. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), for instance,
has “established ‘effective supranational adjudication’ in Europe.” Id.
109
Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 114.
110
MCFEE, supra note 102.
111
See id.
112
See id. at 106–08.
113
See Douglass R. Burgess Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
(July/August 2005), available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August2005/feature_burgess_julaug05.msp.
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state act of clandestinely fostering piracy for its own benefit at the ex114
pense of another nation. Therefore, piracy by definition embodies
an element of state action, as do most modern international human
rights claims.
Kontorovich’s fifth characteristic, the fact that piracy occurred
on the high seas, suggests that piracy was distinguishable from other
violations of international law because the act commonly occurred
outside the sovereign territory of any state and, thus, was subject to
115
universal jurisdiction.
Kontorovich used the common loci of piracy, the high seas, to limit the offenses for which universal jurisdic116
In doing so, however, he failed to recognize
tion may be invoked.
that it was not merely the fact that piracy occurred on the high seas,
outside of the sovereign territory of any nation, which made it subject
to universal jurisdiction, but also that no nation acting alone could
keep its shores and ships on the high seas safe from pirate plunder
117
otherwise.
Thus, to eradicate the offense of piracy in the known
world, universal measures had to be taken.
Finally, Kontorovich claimed that “pirates indiscriminately attacked the ships of all nations, as they were not constrained by ties of
118
national loyalty or the limitations contained in a letter of marque.”
Consistent with the retort to the fourth point above, pirates did not
always attack ships indiscriminately because often they were em119
As such, a pirate ship
ployed by a state to attack specified parties.
would not attack the merchant ships of a nation that had been its
120
benefactor. As one scholar of eighteenth century piracy explains,
[t]he political, economic, and social elites in England attempted
to distinguish pirates from imperialists during the early decades
of the eighteenth-century. Only a few decades earlier, the state
appreciated the terror that pirates spread throughout the Spanish-controlled [territories], but as the English began to colonize
some of these territories for themselves, they used laws, propaganda, and popular literature to vilify piracy and glorify imperial
trade and colonial occupation. However, the moral and social

114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
See Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 114–15.
See id.
See Burgess, supra note 113.
See Kontorovich, supra note 8, at 115.
See MCFEE, supra note 102.
See id.

NIKOLICFINAL

2007]

4/20/2007 12:56:58 PM

COMMENT

913

differences between pirates and imperialists were much less
121
clear.

In light of the analysis of Kontorovich’s characteristics of piracy,
this Comment proposes here that the following characteristics are
central to the offense of piracy at international law: (1) although piracy was officially a municipal offense in most nations, it was often
122
state-sponsored in the eighteenth century; (2) although piracy did
not have a narrow and universally agreed upon definition due to the
underhanded practices of the states at the time, it was subject to universal jurisdiction because those who captured pirates (or privateers)
were at liberty to prosecute them without objection from the state
123
that had sponsored them; (3) since states disassociated from the pirates they sponsored upon their capture by another state, disputes
about where and how to prosecute the accused did not arise unless,
of course, a state was so bold as to seek to protect the pirates and,
124
thereby, expose their association; (4) all pirates were not private actors by definition; they often sought the sponsorship and protection
of their state, which the state was eager to oblige because their con125
duct reaped rewards for the state; and (5) pirates did not indiscriminately attack ships of all nations because they were constrained
126
by ties to national objectives.
As previously noted, Sosa mandated that “federal courts should
not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations
of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar
127
when [ATS] was enacted.”
There, the Court indicated the offense
of piracy in the eighteenth century was of such a definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations as to give an actionable claim un128
With the characteristics of piracy that are identified
der the ATS.
above to serve as a guide, this Comment will next attempt to demonstrate that arbitrary detention is of no less definite content and accep-

121
Matthew Teorey, Pirates and State-Sponsored Terrorism in Eighteenth-Century England, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON EVIL AND HUMAN WICKEDNESS 2, 53 (2003), available at
http://www.wickedness.net/ejvn2/ejv1n2_teorey.pdf.
122
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 100; MCFEE, supra note 102,
at 109–10.
123
See MCFEE, supra note 102, at 109–10.
124
See id.
125
See id.
126
See id.
127
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
128
Id.
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tance among civilized nations today than piracy was in the eighteenth
century.
A. Applying Sosa to Arbitrary Detention Claims
Although Sosa warns against broad recognition of international
customary norms under the ATS, the standard it espoused is easily
satisfied by a multitude of international laws because the modern
world has aggressively defined and recognized international custom129
ary law. The prohibition of arbitrary detention is one such interna130
tional law that has been well defined and widely recognized and, as
such, it unquestionably satisfies the Sosa “definiteness” and “acceptance” standard.
The content of the offense of piracy was anything but definite in
the eighteenth century. As highlighted above, it was riddled with nuanced interpretations, which served to promote the state practices of
131
selective enforcement.
Although most states formally denounced
piracy as an offense against nations, piracy flourished as a statesponsored practice until 1856, when the Declaration of Paris formally
132
abolished it. Consequently, piracy sets a low bar for definiteness of
content and acceptance among civilized nations. As evidenced by a
multitude of modern multilateral treaties (including the U.N. Charter), the nations of the world today are much more interconnected
and closely aligned in their practices than nations were in the eight133
eenth century.
This close relationship has given rise to an amorphous supranational entity, the international community, which re134
The international community has taken
flects their shared values.
these shared values and sought to protect and enforce them through
135
codification. The process of international law codification has pro129
Establishment of an International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(II), preamble, U.N. Doc. A/3881 (1947) [hereinafter International Law Commission] (“[T]he
General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose
of encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.”).
130
See infra notes 137–54 and accompanying text.
131
See MCFEE, supra note 102, at 109–10.
132
See Burgess, supra note 113.
133
See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (4th ed. 2003)
(“Treaties concluded between 1648 and 1919 fill 226 thick books, between 1929 and
1946 some 205 more volumes, and between 1946 and 1999, 2,049 more [volumes].”).
134
Jost Delbruck, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public
Authority Beyond the State, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 31–32 (2004). In the
twentieth century “[s]tate independence increasingly gave way to interdependence and
institutionalized cooperation.” Id. at 31.
135
See International Law Commission, supra note 129.

NIKOLICFINAL

2007]

4/20/2007 12:56:58 PM

COMMENT

915

duced laws that are much more definite in content and more widely
accepted by civilized nations than any internationally recognized
136
norms were in the eighteenth century.
1.

International Law Condemnation of Arbitrary
Detention

The international community has defined arbitrary detention
and declared it impermissible in the following conventions: Article 9
137
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of the
138
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides a
detailed account of the procedures that must be afforded a detained
person in order for his detention to be permissible and not arbi139
trary.
Additionally, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, established by the U.N. Human Rights Commission, has provided standards for the detention of prisoners that arguably establish
140
an international law norm that allows no derogation.
136

See id.
G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 42, art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”).
138
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
art. 9, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (“No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI)].
139
Id.
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be
promptly informed of any charges against him. 3. Anyone arrested or
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall
not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in
custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at
any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise,
for execution of the judgment. 4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty
by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a
court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention
shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
Id.
140
See LEILA ZERROUGUI, CHAIRPERSON-RAPPORTEUR, Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6 (2004), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/
137
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Arbitrary detention is indeed more definite in content and more
141
widely accepted today than piracy was in the eighteenth century.
Moreover, the characteristics of arbitrary detention are closely related
to the characteristics of piracy that provided the basis for pronouncing piracy a violation of the law of nations. First, like piracy in the
eighteenth century, prohibition against arbitrary detention today is
142
widely recognized as fundamental. Second, the prohibition of arbitrary detention today has a narrower universally agreed upon definition than piracy did in the eighteenth century because its definition is
contained in many international documents to which the interna143
tional community has consented. However, like piracy, the definiteness of the definition of arbitrary detention is often contravened
144
by deviations in state practice.
But, unlike in the eighteenth century, today there are international committees in place to oversee the
145
state compliance with the prohibition of arbitrary detention. Thus,
the sanctity of the definition of arbitrary detention is retained because any deviation from it is espoused and denounced. Third, arbitrary detention, like piracy, does not give rise to significant interna146
tional disputes over adjudication of the case.
Fourth, like piracy,
the offense of arbitrary detention is most commonly committed by
state actors because the state provides them with false authority to de147
Finally,
tain because their conduct garners rewards for the states.
arbitrary detention, like piracy, is not an indiscriminate act. It arises
doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/167/19/PDF/G0416719.pdf?OpenElement
(indicating
that the “Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established by the Commission
on Human Rights in its resolution 1991/42 and entrusted with the investigation of
instances of alleged arbitrary deprivation of liberty, according to the standards set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned.”).
141
See id.
142
In the United States, freedom from arbitrary detention is a constitutional right.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without
due process of the law.”).
143
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 138–41.
144
For instance, the Bush Administrations maintains that the detentions in Guantánamo are not arbitrary because the President claims to have authority to detain individuals in such a manner, even though—as the comment argues—it is widely accepted that they do constitute arbitrary detention as defined by international law.
Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, the Sec’ys of
State and Def., the Attorney Gen., Chief of Staff to the President, Dir. Of Cent. Intel.,
Asst. to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1–2 (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter President Bush Memorandum]. In this way, the Bush
Administration invariably undermines the definition of arbitrary detention.
145
See International Law Commission, supra note 129.
146
See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
147
See supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
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when state actors, who are pursuing legitimate ends (such as national
security), do not have a legal cause for detaining a person, do not follow adequate procedure for taking the person into custody, or do not
provide the detainee with the procedural safeguards he is entitled
148
to.
In addition, United States courts have repeatedly held that arbi149
trary detention violates international law.
For instance, in Martinez
150
v. City of Los Angeles, the court found a “clear international prohibi151
tion against arbitrary arrest and detention.” which is actionable un152
der the ATS. Detention is arbitrary, according to Martinez, if “it is
not pursuant to law; it may be arbitrary also if it is incompatible with
153
the principles of justice or with the dignity of the human person.”
Likewise, in Sosa, the Court did not explicitly determine that arbitrary
detention is a violation of the law of nations sufficient to give rise to
an ATS claim (because it found that the facts of Sosa did not give rise
to arbitrary detention), it did recognize that “pursuant to “customary
international human rights law that a . . . ‘a state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or
154
condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention.’”
B. The Guantánamo Bay Detentions are Arbitrary Within the
Meaning of the Law of Nations
International laws provide detailed instructions on the permissible scope of detention and the procedural safeguards that must be

148
See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that individuals imprisoned for years without being charged were arbitrarily detained); see also Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(finding that indefinite detention without periodic hearings violates international
law).
149
See, e.g., Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998);
Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992); Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988); De Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162, 184–85 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335 (S.D.
Fla. 1994); Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541.
150
141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998).
151
Id. at 1384.
152
Id.
153
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.,
§ 702 cmt. h (1987)).
154
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702 (1987)).
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afforded to those detained in both times of war and times of peace.
With respect to non-state actors, such as members of terrorist groups,
international law dictates that detention and prosecution of members
of these organizations should be governed by national law because
“criminal organizations receive no legal recognition as international
156
As Mary Ellen O’Connell, a prominent scholar on the use
actors.”
of force, explains:
Before September 11, 2001, terrorist organizations remained
largely the subject of national criminal law. A variety of treaties
and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have mandated that states take action to suppress
terrorism, but these obligations had been directed at states. Even
when terrorist groups have used significant and sustained armed
violence, their acts were treated as criminal unless a state was
found to be legally responsible for the actions of the group. In
those cases where a state was responsible, a significant act of violence could be treated as an armed attack, giving rise to the right
to self-defense by the victim under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. For criminal groups’ acts of violence to rise to the
level of direct concern for international law, the view has been
that non-state actor must be connected with a state or be in a position to challenge a state authority by controlling significant territory. The acts of groups lacking these links . . . are usually
157
viewed as acts of criminal violence, not acts of war.

Thus, international law draws a sharp distinction between nonstate actors who engage in international violence and state actors who
158
engage in international violence. In international law, the actions
of the latter are capable of justifiably provoking a nation’s use of
force against another nation—thus triggering the application of the
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners (“Geneva Convention”), which governs detention of enemy combatants in time of
159
war. On the other hand, a nation’s use of force against a non-state

155

See Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, at arts. 3,4 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 138, art. 52.
156
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global
War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 440 (2005).
157
Id. at 445.
158
Id.
159
Id. It should be noted that the MCA attempts to deprive the federal courts of
authority to enforce the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600 (2006). This portion of the MCA is likely unenforceable because the
federal courts are obliged to enforce treaty provisions because treaties are the “supreme law of the land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also The Head Money Cases, 112
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160

actor is not justifiable. Consequently, under international law, international terrorist organizations are to be treated as criminals subject to national laws, who are afforded all the procedural protections
161
a nation’s law provides.
Instead of continuing to treat al Qaeda as an international
criminal organization, devoid of international status (or “personality”), the Bush Administration responded to the tragedies of 9/11 by
162
elevating their status to combatants. As such, the Bush Administration triggered the application of the Geneva Convention—which had
163
previously been reserved only for state actors—to terrorist suspects.
The Bush Administration, however, did not acknowledge that the
Geneva Convention applied to the conflict termed the “War on Ter164
Accepting the legal conclusions of the Department of Jusror.”
165
tice, President Bush “determine[d] that common Article 3 of [the]
166
Geneva [Convention] does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban
detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are
international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to ‘armed
167
conflict not of an international character.’” Additionally, the President concluded that the Taliban and al Qaeda detainees are “unlawful combatants” and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war un168
der Article 4 of the Geneva Convention. Thus, as one author aptly
put it,
U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (A treaty is to be enforced “whenever its provisions prescribe a
rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.”).
160
O’Connell, supra note 156, at 445.
161
See id.
162
Memorandum from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department
of
Defense,
Enemy
Combatants
(Dec.
12,
2002),
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5312 [hereinafter Haynes Memorandum]
(“The President has determined that al Qaeda members are unlawful combatants
because (among other reasons) they are members of a non-state actor terrorist group
that does not receive the protections of the Third Geneva Convention.”).
163
O’Connell, supra note 156, at 454.
164
President Bush Memorandum, supra note 144, at 1–2.
165
Memorandum from Assistant Attorney Gen. Jay S. Bybee to White House
Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and Dep’t of Def. Gen. Counsel William J. Hayes II, at
9–10 (Jan. 22, 2002) (concluding that the Geneva Convention does not apply to al
Qaeda overall because (1) its members did not satisfy the four basic criteria for prisoner of war status, i.e., they were not under the command of a responsible individual, they did not wear insignia, they did not carry arms openly, and they did not obey
the laws of war and (2) “[a]l Qaeda is not a state”). See also Third Geneva Convention, supra note 155, art. 4(A)(2).
166
Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention provides protection for civilians in
times of war.
167
President Bush Memorandum, supra note 144.
168
Haynes Memorandum, supra note 162.
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[i]n classifying the detainees as unlawful combatants, the United
States, it seems, asserts the right to treat the detainees in any way
it deems appropriate—unencumbered by international legal obligation. For example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
stated that the United States would, as a matter of policy, treat the
detainees humanely, but made clear that the United States was
169
under no legal obligation to do so.

The consequence of the Bush Administration’s classification of
those it alleges are members or affiliates of al Qaeda is that over five
hundred foreign nationals have been indefinitely detained in
Guantánamo Bay without charges or other basic procedural guaran170
tees that legitimate a government’s detention of a person. The detainees held under these circumstances have a legitimate cause of action under the ATS for arbitrary detention because their detention is
arbitrary within the narrowest definition of arbitrary detention at international law and is as definite in content and acceptance among
171
civilized nations as piracy was in 1789.
IV.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BAR DETAINEES’ ATS CLAIMS

The Supreme Court in Rasul reversed the dismissal of the detainees’ ATS claims, holding that the “[ATS] explicitly confers the
privilege of suing for an actionable ‘tort . . . committed in violation of
172
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’ on aliens alone.”
Therefore, the Court held that the District Court of the District of
173
Columbia has jurisdiction over detainees’ ATS claims.
Instead of
reviewing the detainees’ ATS claims as the Supreme Court mandated,
however, the district court has declined to review the detainees’
claims by holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars such
174
claims. Although the Court did not explicitly address the question
169
Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 367,
370 (2004) (citing Fact Sheet, White House Press Office, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2002/
02/20020207-13.html).
170
MARK DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEE: A PROFILE OF 517
THROUGH
ANALYSIS
OF
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE
DATA
4,
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/230/guantanamo-report.pdf (last visited March 1,
2007); Petitioners’ Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
at 56, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Memorandum].
171
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702 (1987)).
172
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
173
See id.
174
See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480–81
(D.D.C. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 326 n.19 (D.D.C. 2005); Al Odah
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of sovereign immunity, its holding cannot be reconciled with the district court’s opinion that these claims are barred by the doctrine of
175
sovereign immunity. Thus, the district court’s dismissal of the ATS
claims on the basis of sovereign immunity is impermissible because it
departs from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rasul.
Whether the United States is amenable to suit under the ATS
has been at the heart of recent ATS litigation, notwithstanding the
176
Supreme Court’s holding in Rasul. The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the government absent explicit congres177
sional waiver of the immunity. Accordingly, most case law indicates
that sovereign immunity cannot be waived by the ATS without ex178
plicit congressional authority.
On the other hand, however, it is
arguable that the ATS implicitly waives sovereign immunity because it
has primarily been used to challenge state action that has allegedly
179
Thus, if the courts continue
violated international human rights.
to recognize United States sovereign immunity, they will effectively
180
render the ATS useless.
v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring),
aff’d, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 n.11
(D.D.C. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
175
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
176
See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 480–81; Khalid, 355
F. Supp. 2d at 326 n.19; Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150 (Randolph, J., concurring), aff’d,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 64 n.11, rev’d on other
grounds, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
177
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96 (1937); United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing
Co., 329 U.S. 654, 660–61 (1947).
178
See Bieregu v. Ashcroft, 259 F. Supp. 2d 342, 354 (D.N.J. 2003) (finding that
the ATS does not itself waive the sovereign immunity of the United States); see also
Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1206 (S.D. Fla. 2002), reconsideration
denied, 2002 WL 31954452 (S.D. Fla. 2002), reconsideration denied, 2002 WL 31954453
(S.D. Fla. 2002). Generally, sovereign immunity bars the assertion of jurisdiction over
the United States in suits that seek “money or property damages or some form of coercive injunctive relief.” 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654 (3d ed. 2005). However, sovereign
immunity does not operate in every proceeding that might affect a governmental interest. Id. (citing United States v. Rural Elec. Convenience Co-op Co., 922 F.2d 429,
434 (7th Cir. 1991)).
179
See Torture Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)) (“provides a cause of action for official torture and extrajudicial killing”); but see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428, 434–35 (1989), where the Supreme Court held that the ATS does not itself
waive foreign sovereign immunity. As such, in order to carry out an ATS claim
against a foreign state in U.S. courts, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1605, must waive the foreign sovereign’s immunity with respect to
the act complained of. See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434–35.
180
That is, at least as far as U.S. actors are amenable to suit. On the other hand,
foreign sovereigns are amenable to suit under the ATS, so long as the claim satisfies
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The Bush Administration has consistently argued that sovereign
immunity, which includes military authority, bars judicial review of
181
claims brought by detainees under the ATS against U.S. officials.
Conceding that “the [ATS] does not itself waive . . . sovereign immu182
nity,” detainees have asserted, in response, that the Administrative
183
Procedure Act (APA) waives sovereign immunity by providing for
judicial review for “any person suffering legal wrong because of
184
agency action . . . [and] seeking relief other than money damages.”
The detainees have argued that violations of the ATS constitute such
“legal wrongs” and seek injunctive relief and declaratory judgment
that “the conditions of their confinement violate customary international law and international treaties prohibiting prolonged deten185
tion.”
The APA provides a presumption that agency action is reviewable absent express statutory preclusion or explicit and exclusive
186
delegation to the discretion of the agency by law.
Additionally, it
mandates review of agency action when there is “no other adequate
187
remedy in a court.”
Once the detainees established that “the
United States Army is an agency within the meaning [of section 701]
188
of the APA,” they argued that the Army’s actions with respect to the
detainees’ confinement are subject to judicial review because there is

one of the offenses listed in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603,
it can be brought against a foreign sovereign.
181
See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480–81
(D.D.C. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 255 F. Supp. 2d 311, 326 n.19 (D.D.C. 2005); Al Odah
v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring);
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 n.11 (D.D.C. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 542
U.S. 466 (2004).
182
See Bieregu v. Ashcroft, 259 F .Supp. 2d 342, 354 (D.N.J. 2003).
183
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2000).
184
Petitioners’ Memorandum, supra note 170, at 44. The APA also provides for a
waiver of sovereign immunity for “action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208–09
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (acknowledging that the APA may waive sovereign immunity under
the ATS).
185
Petitioners’ Memorandum, supra note 170, at 44.
186
See, e.g., Von Clemm v. Banuelos, 365 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Mass. 1973), aff’d
498 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
187
5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review.”).
188
Petitioners’ Memorandum, supra note 170, at 45 (citing Jaffee v. United States,
592 F.2d 712, 719 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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no “other adequate remedy in a court.”
Specifically, they argued
that there is no “statutory review proceeding” applicable to actions of
the Army with respect to the conditions of the detainees’ confine190
ment, which is at issue under the ATS claim. Further, they indicated that an arbitrary detention claim under the ATS “do[es] not
fall within the category of claims for which habeas is the exclusive
remedy,” and, as such, a habeas proceeding does not provide an “ade191
quate remedy” foreclosing judicial review. Finally, they addressed
the government’s contention that military related exceptions to the
192
APA prevent the waiver of sovereign immunity.
The exemptions invoked by the government against APA waiver
of sovereign immunity are either for “court martials and military
193
commissions” or “military authority exercised in the field in time of
194
However, the detainees indicated
war or in occupied territory.”
that the “military authority” exemption is not applicable to arbitrary
detention because it is “intended to prohibit ‘judicial interference
with the relationship between soldiers and their military superiors’
and ‘military commands made in combat zones or in preparation for,
195
or in the aftermath of, battle.’” Additionally, the detainees argued,
the military exemption is not applicable because the detainees are
not being held in “occupied territory” or “in the field” and, thus,
196
cannot interfere with military functions as required for it to apply.
Lastly, even if the executive’s discretion to wage war and capture
enemies is not reviewable, the APA still may waive sovereign immunity with respect to ATS claims, the detainees explained, because the
APA does not provide the military with absolute discretion to detain
individuals, especially if the conditions of their detention are in violation of international human rights standards, constitutional law, and
197
the laws of war.
Since governmental actions during war have traditionally been
198
subject to judicial review when violations of liberty are alleged, it
189

Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704).
Id. at 46.
191
Id. at 47 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 563 (2004)).
192
Id. at 51.
193
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(F) (2000).
194
Id. § 701(b)(1)(G).
195
Petitioners’ Memorandum, supra note 170, at 49 (quoting Doe v. Sullivan, 938
F.2d 1370, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
196
Id.
197
Id. at 51.
198
Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[E]ven the war
power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”).
190
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follows that there is no reason to believe that the Authorization for
199
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) forecloses judicial review of such
200
On the contrary, the detainees
claims in the “War on Terrorism.”
contended that nothing in the “AUMF authorizes indefinite deten201
tion without charges.”
Accordingly, the brief concluded by noting
that the judiciary is obliged to review allegations of arbitrary deten202
tion under the ATS.
The government’s assertion of sovereign immunity has prevailed
203
in each of the recent detainee ATS cases.
In Al Odah v. United
204
States, Judge Randolph, in concurrence, explained that the ATS
does not waive sovereign immunity because Congress has not pro205
vided for its explicit waiver in this context.
Further, assuming that
the APA provides a general waiver of sovereign immunity, the judge
indicated, that the “military authority” exemption bars any such
206
Judge Randolph reasoned that the exemptions discussed
waiver.
earlier are applicable because in each case the detained was taken “in
the field in time of war,” asserting that the language implies much
broader meaning which reaches the captivity of those in Guantanamo
207
Additionally, the judge explained that the military detentions
Bay.

199

S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted):
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
200
Petitioners’ Memorandum, supra note 170, at 52.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 53.
203
See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainees, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480–81 (D.D.C.
2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 326 n.19 (D.D.C. 2005); Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring), aff’d,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 n.11 (D.D.C.
2002), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
204
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
205
See id. at 1149–50 (Randolph, J., concurring). Judge Randolph’s opinion reflects Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s reasoning in Rasul. Although Rasul was overturned by
the Supreme Court with respect to its denial of federal court jurisdiction to hear
claims brought by aliens under the ATS, the Supreme Court did not rule on the sovereign immunity issue. Consequently, lower courts, such as the District Court for the
District of Columbia in Al Odah, have continued to dismiss ATS claims on the ground
of sovereign immunity by invoking Rasul’s reasoning with respect to the APA.
206
See id.
207
See id. at 1150.
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are precluded from judicial review because they are “committed to
208
agency discretion by law.”
The use of sovereign immunity to preempt judicial review of detainee ATS claims has become so accepted that in one of the latest
cases, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, the court did not proffer an
209
independent justification for its holding.
Instead, the court simply
directed the reader’s attention to the treatment of this issue in Rasul
210
and Judge Randolph’s concurrence in Al Odah.
A. Sovereign Immunity and the International Law Approach
Under principles of international law, the courts should not recognize the Government’s assertion of sovereign immunity because
such an assertion by a state is inappropriate when international hu211
man rights violations, including arbitrary detention, are alleged.
Sovereign immunity is limited in international law by obligations
called erga omnes, which are owed to the international community
212
Some of these obligations conrather than to any particular state.
208

Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1966)). “This exclusion applies when ‘a
court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). “The
military’s judgment about how to confine the detainees necessarily depends upon ‘a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.’” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
The level of threat a detainee poses to United States interests, the
amount of intelligence a detainee might be able to provide, the conditions under which the detainee may be willing to cooperate, the disruption visits from family members and lawyers might cause - these
types of judgments have traditionally been left to the exclusive discretion of the Executive Branch, and there they should remain.
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150 (Randolph, J., concurring); see also United States ex rel.
Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403 F.2d 371, 375 n.2. (D.C. Cir.
2003), Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 406 (D.C.
Cir.1990).
209
See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481–90 (D.D.C.
2005).
210
Id.
211
See JANIS, supra note 133, at 36 (“[Jus cogens] is the notion that there exist some
rules of international law so fundamental that they prohibit acts by states even if such
conduct is expressly sanctioned by state consent.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. N (1986) (identifying the
prohibition against prolonged arbitrary detention as a jus cogens norm); see also Steven Folgelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
833, 868 (1990) (noting that Nazis on trial at Nuremburg could not use sovereign
immunity as a defense to crimes that are considered jus cogens).
212
Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10(2) EUR. J.
237, 271 (1999), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/
OF INT’L L.
No2/art1-07.html (citing Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd., 1970 I.C.J.

NIKOLICFINAL

926

4/20/2007 12:56:58 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:893

cern the protection of fundamental human rights (also referred to as
jus cogens) and operate under the premise that “every state has a legal
213
interest in their fulfillment.” Accordingly, “any unilateral action or
international agreement which violates them is absolutely prohib214
ited.”
Additionally, some have claimed that jus cogens protects cer215
tain individual human rights directly and, in Siderman de Blake v. Re216
public of Argentina, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that “the right to be free from official torture is
fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status
217
The paramount naunder international law, a norm of jus cogens.”
ture of jus cogens, as embodied in individual human rights, indicates
that state actors are not at liberty to assert sovereign immunity in the
face of violation of such rights.
Like genocide and torture, arbitrary detention is widely considered a jus cogens, a fundamental human right or “a set of norms from
218
which no derogation is ever admitted under international law.”
As
such, the prohibition against arbitrary detention is subject to universal jurisdiction, that is, any state may (and indeed has the obligation
to) assert jurisdiction over individual allegations of arbitrary deten219
tion. The notion that sovereign immunity is inoperable in the face
of an allegation of a jus cogens violation is fundamental to the princi220
pal of universal jurisdiction.
Although the Court in Sosa did not decide that only violations of
international norms that are jus cogens are recognizable under the
32). Erga omnes obligations can be distinguished from those that arise when two or
more nations enter into a treaty in which they explicitly define the obligations that
operate under the treaty with respect to each other. Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
See JANIS, supra 133, at 65 (citing Robledo, Le jus cogens international: sa
genese, sa nature, ses functions, 172 HAGUE RECUEIL 9, 167–87 (1981)).
216
965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
217
Id. at 717. There, the court explained that “[w]hereas customary international
law derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms
constituting jus cogens transcend such consent, as exemplified by the theories underlying the judgments of the Nuremburg Tribunals following World War II.” Id. at 715.
Also, in 1987, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found the United
States had violated jus cogens by executing two minors. See Donald T. Fox, InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Violation, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
601, 601 (1988).
218
Bianchi, supra note 212, at 271; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986) (providing that “a state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones
prolonged arbitrary detention.”).
219
See Bianchi, supra note 212.
220
Id.
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ATS, its cautionary language with respect to recognizing claims suggests that the judiciary would be more justified in upholding a jus cogens claim than a non-jus cogens claim. Additionally, violations of jus
cogens claims, unlike those based on customary international law pertaining to business, for instance, are readily able to satisfy the Sosa requirement of definiteness and universal acceptance. Thus, since the
prohibition against arbitrary detention, as a jus cogens, would satisfy
the Sosa standard by virtue of its definite definition and ubiquitous
acceptance, it follows that United States courts should not recognize
sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review. Recognition of sovereign immunity in the face of such claims does violence to centuries of
international human rights law development and to the status of
United States courts as guardians and facilitators of human rights law.
V. CONCLUSION
The ATS is the only legislative provision that affirmatively requires the federal courts to recognize and review violations of international law. As such, the ATS bestows on the courts the constitutional duty to review tort claims brought by aliens alleging violations
221
In carving out an exception for United States
of international law.
state actors, the courts are failing to use the ATS as a tool for justice
222
and, instead, using it as a shield for injustice.
The courts should find that sovereign immunity is waived under
the ATS because arbitrary detention is a violation of the laws of na223
tions for the purposes of the ATS.
The courts’ reliance on sovereign immunity as a shield to accusations of official arbitrary detention
in violation of the ATS is weak because it is a firmly established international law principle that sovereign immunity does not bar claims of
224
arbitrary detention. In light of this, in order to deny the detainees’
claims, the federal courts have only two equally undesirable options:
they can either completely disregard the extent of international
agreements stipulating that freedom from arbitrary detention is a
fundamental human right by deciding that the international law
principle prohibiting arbitrary detention does not meet the requirements of Sosa’s eighteenth century paradigm or they can continue to
stand in outright opposition to international law and maintain that
U.S. officials are immune from accusations of arbitrary detention.
Since deciding in either direction will negatively impact the United
221
222
223
224

See Part II.A.
See Part IV.
See Part III.A.1.
See supra notes 211–20 and accompanying text.
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States judiciary’s role as interpreters and sources of international law,
the courts should substantively review the detainees ATS claims of arbitrary detention.

